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I Introduction 
Inflation is one of the intractable problems the Ghanaian economy has faced 
for a very long time. Having registered low rates of inflation in the years 
immediately after independence, the country had its first taste of double-digit 
inflation in 1964. This was followed by a brief period of respite during 
1967-71 with inflation below 10% per annum. Since 1972, however, inflation 
levels have remained generally high, ranging between 10% (1972) and 123% 
(1983), (see Table 1). The high rates of inflation have undermined the 
otherwise impressive macro performance since the introduction of the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). 
There is a general consensus that the pre-1983 inflation may be largely 
attributed to excessive demand pressure fuelled by monetary growth attendant 
upon fiscal deficit financing.1 Price stabilization policies under the adjustment 
programme have, therefore, mostly involved policies directed at curtailing 
increases in money supply. These have included the imposition of a 'credit 
squeeze' on the banking system and the elimination of fiscal deficits. In spite 
of these policies, inflation rates have continued to be above targets set within 
the programme, at 25% or more since 1986, although well below the rates 
during the decade 1973-83. Chhibber and Shaflk (1990) conclude that 
monetary factors still dominate Ghanaian inflationary pressures. 
The primary motivation for this study is to identify the sources of 
inflationary pressures in Ghana and to suggest ways to mitigate such pressures. 
Even though our interest is in explaining post-1983 inflation, the analysis 
extends to the pre-ERP period in order to allow useful comparisons. 
The paper continues in Section II with an historical overview of inflation 
in Ghana. A review of the literature on inflation is in Section III. The 
formulation and estimation of an inflationary model is "in Section IV. An 
explanation of the inflationary process, based on both the econometric 
estimation and actual occurrences, is provided in Section V. We conclude with 
suggestions for the control of inflation. 
Table 1 Some economic indicators (rates of change, %) 
Growth in Growth in Interest Exchange Inflation Food 
Year real GDP money (M2) rate rate rate inflation 
Y M R E Pf 
1960 2.30 11.4 4.0 0.71 0.9 -2.30 
1961 6.17 8.8 4.5 0.71 6.2 17.96 
1962 4.83 14.9 4.5 0.71 5.9 2.34 
1963 3.47 7.5 4.5 0.71 5.6 16.55 
1964 2.15 37.2 4.5 0.71 15.8 12.33 
1965 1.37 1.7 4.5 0.71 22.7 37.39 
1966 0.09 5.0 7.0 0.71 14.8 17.56 
1967 -3.00 1.3 6.0 0.84 -9.7 -14.94 
1968 6.42 10.3 5.5 1.02 10.7 9.27 
1969 5.88 10.5 5.5 1.02 6.5 8.04 
1970 6.76 9.8 5.5 1.02 3.0 4.55 
1971 5.56 11.2 8.0 1.03 8.8 11.86 
1972 -2.49 40.6 8.0 1.32 10.8 10.95 
1973 15.25 18.9 6.0 1.16 17.1 20.70 
1974 3.39 26.6 6.0 1.15 18.8 16.36 
1975 -12.86 38.0 8.0 1.15 29.8 31.52 
1976 -3.52 37.2 8.0 1.15 55.4 66.55 
1977 2,26 60.0 8.0 1.15 116.5 150.10 
1978 8.48 68.6 13.5 1.51 73.1 57.57 
1979 -3.17 15.8 13.5 2.75 54.5 66.06 
i ? 
Table 1 cont... 
Growth in Growth in Interest Exchange Inflation Food 
Year real GDP money (M2) rate rate rate inflation 
Y M R E Pf 
1980 0.00 33.7 13.5 2.75 50.2 58.18 
1981 -1.79 51.5 19.5 2.75 116.5 108.00 
1982 -7.20 23.3 10.5 2.75 22.3 35.11 
1983 0.70 40.3 14.5 3.45 122.8 140.83 
1984 2.64 53.6 18.0 35.34 39.7 10.96 
1985 5.09 46.2 18.5 54.05 10.3 -9.51 
1986 5.20 47.9 20.5 89.29 24.6 20.31 
1987 4.79 53.3 23.5 147.06 39.8 36.93 
1988 6.23 46.3 26.0 200.00 31.4 33.00 
1989 5.10 54.7 26.0 270.27 25.2 25.08 
Note: inflation rate, interest rate and exchange rate are annual averages. 
Source: computed from data from IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook,1990, World Bank, 
World Tables, Ghana Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of Statistics. 
IE Historical trends 
Figure 1 illustrates the inflationary trend in Ghana since independence. The 
period before 1973, on average, registered lower rates than the following 
period. Nevertheless, it is more appropriate to divide the analysis into two — 
pre- and post-ERP periods. This way, we shall be able to work out how 
policies within the ERP have acted on the inflationary trend. In the pre-ERP 
period, the analysis will also be sub-divided into regimes in order to clarify the 
effects of each regime's policies. 
Figure 1 Inflation and money growth 
The pre-1983 era 
When Ghana became independent in 1957, the need to increase the level of 
economic development became, pressing. To this end, a rather ambitions 
industrialization programme was adopted. Many import-substitution industries 
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were set up, relying heavily on imported raw materials and other inputs. They 
were owned and managed by the State, and over-protected through a highly 
cascaded tariff structure (high on output, low on inputs), tax rebates, low 
interest charges and government subsidies. In general, these industries 
performed poorly, due, in part, to inefficient management and to increasing 
difficulty over the years in supplying their input requirements in the face of 
foreign exchange scarcities. Other investments were concentrated on social 
overhead capital schemes mainly infrastructural and social facilities with 
long gestation periods and minimal contribution to economic growth in the 
short to medium term. 
Thus, the rapid pace of investment activity that characterized the period 
from independence until 1965 showed more in demand pressure than in 
expansion of output. This exerted a strong upward pressure on prices. Until 
1963, inflation was mitigated through the use of external reserves accumulated 
before independence to finance fiscal deficits and maintain import supplies. 
But as the reserves diminished and increased import duties failed to close the 
budget gap, the government had to resort to bank financing. This contributed 
to strong inflationary pressure during 1964-66 (Table 1). In 1964, money 
supply was increased by 37.2%, increasing inflation to 15.8%. Even though 
growth in money supply slowed down in the following years, the inflationary 
pressures which had been generated in 1964 persisted for at least three years. 
One of the factors which helped to sustain the pressure on prices was the 
increasingly serious foreign exchange constraint which led to shortages of most 
consumer items. 
When the National Liberation Council (NLC) government took over the 
administration of the country in 1966, it took measures to lower the high pace 
of economic activity which characterized the preceding period. In particular, 
it cut back public spending and the use of bank financing. The extensive state 
involvement in the economy was curtailed and investments reduced, leading 
to large-scale economic retrenchment. Meanwhile, monetary policy was 
tightened through interest rate increases and credit restrictions, among other 
measures. 
These steps were carried out in the context of an IMF-sponsored 
stabilization programme adopted in April 1966 (which included a devaluation 
of 30% in July 1967). The effect of the new policy measures was to contain 
inflation in 1967 (when prices actually dropped below the 1966 level) and 
1968 (Table 1), although this was achieved at the cost of economic decline. 
This period of stabilization was followed, during 1969-71, by a marked 
boost in economic activity under the civilian Busia administration. Government 
recurrent and investment outlays increased substantially, sustained, in part, by 
the use of foreign reserves and external borrowing. At the same time, private 
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participation in the economy increased. Tight monetary policy measures were 
introduced to ensure financial stability, including credit restrictions and upward 
revision of interest rates. This did not, however, significantly stem liquidity 
injection, which occurred in response to seasonal increases in bank lending for 
cocoa financing, and in loans to the private sector, following government 
legislation, to take over foreign trading assets. 
Inflation was, however, contained during 1969-71 (Table 1), mainly as a 
result of a combination of domestic output growth and improved import 
supplies under a cocoa price boom in 1970, and a liberalized external trade 
policy. The latter policy, coupled with a down-turn in cocoa prices, put 
enormous strain on the balance of payments, necessitating another devaluation 
(by 44%) in December 1971. 
The following decade, 1972-82, was characterized by the most expansionary 
phase of economic management in the country's history. This period witnessed 
a succession of regimes, largely military, which pursued expansionary fiscal 
programmes buttressed by monetary accommodation as widening budget 
deficits were financed from bank loans to government and parastatals. 
Extensive controls of prices, the exchange rate, and interest rates, were used 
to contain the resulting inflationary pressure. This led to distorted relative 
prices, economic stagnation and severe^ shortage of goods, with strong upward 
pressure (suppressed or otherwise) on prices. A brief stabilization effort, under 
IMF sponsorship from January 1979, failed in June that year as a victim of 
another military intervention. 
Pervasive economic controls and restrictions from 1972 until 1982 bred a 
repertoire of malpractices, including smuggling, parallel market activities in 
goods and foreign currencies, and corruption. Despite the prevalence of price 
controls, however, inflation averaged as high as 50% per annum during 
1972-82/with 1977 and 1981 recording the highest-ever rates of 117% each.2 
Clearly, pre-1983 inflation, especially during the period 1972-82, reflected 
excessive demand pressure sustained by fiscal expansion and consequent 
monetary growth. The problem was made worse by inadequate growth of 
output and supplies due to particular structural constraints faced by the 
economy. 
Foreign exchange scarcity, due in large part to over-reliance on erratic 
cocoa earnings, was the most severe of these constraints. This scarcity 
constrained the capacity to supply essential imports for consumption and 
production, with potential inflationary consequences. 
Another important constraint was inadequate food production and supply. 
This was due to a catalogue of factors including low productivity, poor storage 
and preservation facilities, unreliable weather conditions, inadequate marketing 
and distribution arrangements, fast-growing population and urbanization, and 
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pricing policies aimed at keeping down food prices. Food price rises, caused 
by gaps in supply, also had inflationary effects on the country's economy. 
Inadequate performance of the manufacturing sector also contributed to the 
worsening inflation problem. The problems of the sector included the 
persistence of excess capacity (due to the lack of adequate imported inputs), 
out-dated technologies and inefficient management. The erratic supply of 
consumer goods added to upward pressure on prices. 
For most of the period under consideration, price controls and fixed 
exchange rates were extensively used in an attempt to contain inflation. But 
this only led to suppressed prices and incentives at the producer level without 
removing the causes of inflationary pressures in the economy. The price 
distortions accentuated structural constraints in the external trade sector and 
domestic production. As a result, the economy was in bad shape by 1982, with 
declining income per capita, mounting external deficits, and seriously 
run-down social and economic infrastructure. This led to a considerable 
re-direction of economic management. 
The post-1983 (ERP) era 
Against this background of severe economic difficulties, including strong 
inflationary pressures, the government of the Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) launched the ERP in mid-1983. Supported by the IMF and 
the World Bank, the main purpose of the programme was to stem the slide in 
the economy, minimize imbalances and establish a path of sustainable growth. 
To this end, far-reaching measures have been implemented over the years, 
including large exchange rate corrections, price de-regulation, trade 
liberalization, financial management reforms and the rehabilitation of economic 
and social infrastructure. 
Inflation control has been a key objective under the ERP. Given the role of 
fiscal-deficit financing in pre-1983 inflation, efforts have focused on reducing 
both budgetary deficits and recourse to bank financing. The revenue side has 
improved markedly as a result of improved administration and enlargement of 
the tax base through price de-regulation and exchange rate adjustments. As a 
result, fiscal deficits have been eliminated since 1986. In spite of this, 
however, monetary growth rates have continued to be high, averaging' about 
40% per annum during 1983-89, equal to the average growth rate recorded for 
1972-82.3 
The budget may still constitute an important source of liquidity injection 
and demand pressure in the economy, because recurrent expenditure levels 
have remained high. Moreover, if development projects (financed from external 
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project loans) were taken into account, large budgetary deficits would appear. 
Project loans, of course, constitute a potential source of liquidity injection and 
inflationary pressure, depending on how they are utilized. 
Apart from the budget, other major potential sources of liquidity injection 
are foreign resource infusions under the ERP and 'losses' to the monetary 
authorities attendant upon exchange rate depreciation — the so-called 
'revaluation losses'. Some of these sources will be fully discussed in the next 
section. 
A year after the introduction of the ERP, the rate of inflation dropped from 
an all-time high of 123% to 40%. This remarkable achievement is usually 
attributed to the programme. However, since the programme did not really take 
off until 1984, and since agriculture began to recover from the drought of the 
previous year, it is doubtful that policy reforms alone could explain that feat. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that external inflows which followed the adoption 
of the programme eased the supply constraints, and liberalization enabled 
agricultural production to recover quickly, part of the credit may be given to 
the ERP. 
The fact that supply constraints are important in Ghana's inflation was again 
made evident in 1985 when inflation dropped further to 10%. This was 
associated with an especially good harvest. Food prices actually fell by about 
8%. Thus, the sources of inflation in Ghana cannot be limited only to demand 
factors, and supply factors must also be taken into account. 
Ill Literature survey 
Various models have been applied for the explanation of inflationary trends in 
both developed and developing countries. Variations in the models themselves 
usually stem from differences in the proposed sources of the inflation. Much 
of the literature is dominated by demand theories of inflation, partly because 
they are more amenable to quantitative assessment. The works of Cagan 
(1956), Harberger (1963), Azhar (1973), and de Silva (1977) were all basically 
in the monetary demand framework, with results largely confirming demand-
pull inflation. 
Cost (supply) factors have generally received less attention in the empirical 
literature. But, in general, in the few cases where they were investigated either 
independently or alongside monetary factors, they appeared to have less 
influence than the latter. 
Argy's (1970) attempt to investigate structural inflation for some 22 LDCs, 
showed insignificant results for the structuralist indicators, but monetary factors 
used as 'controls' turned out to be significant. As Argy noted, one main 
problem is that structuralist hypotheses are very difficult to quantify, which 
limits their empirical assessment. 
Studies on hyper-inflationary situations, particularly in Latin America, are 
of interest because of the lessons they provide on the stabilization policies 
adopted for such crises although Ghana itself has not suffered to the same 
degree.4 The Bolivian, Argentine and Brazilian plans all offer lessons in 
stabilization, both heterodox and orthodox, for handling inflationary pressures. 
The causes of inflation prior to 1983 have never been in dispute. Studies by 
Lawson (1966), Ahmad (1970), Ewusi (1977), Steel (1979), and Kwakye 
(1981) of the pre-1983 period confirmed the predominance of demand factors. 
The main source of demand pressure was invariably traced to fiscal deficit 
financing. Lawson, Ewusi and Kwakye found some evidence of food prices 
influencing inflation in Ghana. 
As far as the post-1983 inflation is concerned, little published work is 
available. A recent study by Chhibber and Shafik (1990) of the World Bank 
is probably the most important available for review. The study was part of 
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wider research into the inflationary effects of policy adjustments (especially 
exchange rate reforms) in Africa. 
Chhibber and Shafik's approach attempted to integrate, in a single 
framework, three transmission mechanisms for inflation, the fiscal/monetary 
process, direct cost-push factors, and real factors. They specified a model 
incorporating a price-determination process, whereby prices were related to 
wage-push and exchange-rate-induced costs, and mark-ups over these costs. 
The mark-ups were made a function of excess demand in the economy which, 
in turn, was made {a la Walras Law) a function of excess money supply. The 
model also included relationships for exchange rate determination, 
monetary/fiscal sectors and the real sector to illustrate linkages to the price 
determination process. Their analysis included simulations to test certain 
issues. Some of the more important results of their study were as follows: 
1. Monetary growth was instrumental in determining the pace of inflation. The 
expansion in money supply was fuelled largely by net foreign asset 
injections in recent years. Low financial intermediation was also partly to 
blame for the high money supply level; 
2. Official exchange-rate-induced inflation was not significant, as prices had 
already adjusted to the parallel exchange rate. Rather, parallel 
exchange-rate-induced inflation was significant; 
3. Wage-push inflation was insignificant, as real wages had declined steadily; 
4. Fiscal policy had a limited role in current inflationary issues, as cuts in 
current expenditure would reduce monetary growth and inflation only to a 
limited extent. 
It is our belief that Ghana's inflation is explained by more than just monetary 
factors, as Chhibber and Shafik's results indicate. A possible reason for these 
results may have to do with the way in which real factors are captured. By 
formulating the real factors as monetary factors (a la Walras), they lost the 
ability to isolate the real side and instead accentuated the effect of the 
monetary factors. 
IV Econometric analysis 
I he model 
An alternative model to specify all the possible causes of inflation and test 
them econometricaliy can be set up. Using the known sources of inflation (i.e., 
monetary factors, real factors, and expectations) we specify the simple model 
in (1): 
(1) P=UM,Y,E,n 
Equation (1) specifies that inflation (P) is dependent on growth in money (M) 
and output (Y), the rate of exchange (E) defined as the domestic price of 
foreign currency, and price expectations (F) . A change in money supply feeds 
into price changes with a lag. Similarly, shortages in output generally precede 
inflationary peaks (see Figure 2: 1976-77, 1980-81 and 1982-83). Up to 1983, 
the fixed exchange rate regime did not allow wide swings in the exchange rate 
to affect price formation. With the introduction of the ERP, the exchange rate 
devaluations have been feeding into the inflation rate. A slope dummy is 
attached to the exchange rate to account for the massive devaluations since 
1983. Price expectation is assumed to be formed adaptively. Thus, the relevant 
equation for estimation is: 
(2) P = aQ + axM_x + a 2M_2 + a 3 F + + asE + a6E\ + a1P_l + U 
where all variables are as defined before and are in logs, El is product of the 
dummy .variable and the exchange rate, and U is an error term, assumed to be 
normally and independently distributed. 
An increase in money supply or exchange rate is expected to generate 
inflationary pressure; hence their parameter estimates should be of positive 
signs. On the other hand, the parameter estimates for the output coefficient 
must be negative, since output shortages are likely to lead to inflationary 
pressures. It is also expected that a high inflationary rate for a previous year 
may be built into negotiations and thus result in an inflationary spiral. 
12 RESEARCH PAPER 2 2 
Therefore, the sign of the coefficient of the lagged inflation rate should be 
positive. 
Figure 2 Inflation and output growth 
Empirical results 
Using data computed from IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank 
World Tables, and Ghana Statistical Service Quarterly Digest of Statistics, an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) technique was used to estimate Equation 2. Data 
on the exchange rates on the parallel market rate was obtained from data in 
May 1985. The equation is specified in logs and levels of values used for the 
estimation. Because of a suspicion of serial correlation, a Cochrane-Orcutt 
technique was applied to the data and the result is reported in Table 2 below. 
The high F indicates the joint significance of the explanatory variables at 
the 1% significance level; while 99.80% of the variations in the inflation rate 
is explained by variations in the explanatory variables. This "high R 2 is 
expected since Equation 1 specifies almost all the theoretically known causes 
of inflation. Most of the parameters are individually significant at the 5% 
significance level. Exchange rate (the parallel rate) changes do not seem to 
have had significant effects on inflation prior to 1983. With the exception of 
the coefficient of the exchange rate variable (Bl), all the other parameters have 
the expected signs. In the case of the exchange rate, the right sign is obtained 
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Table 2 Ordinary least squares estimation 
13 
Dependent variable is P1 
28 observations used for estimation from 1962 to 1989 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-Ratio 
C1 2.2989 1.0660 2.1566 
M1(-1) 0.6176 0.2344 2.6351 
M2(-2) 0.5434 0.2952 1.8408 
Y1 -1.1711 0.1723 -6.7951 
Y1(-1) -0.0563 0.0280 -2.0137 
B1 -0.0707 0.0986 -0.7168 
B2 0.1229 0.0297 4.1414 
P(-1) -0.0003 0.0001 -2.6080 
R2 0.9985 F-statistic F(7,20) 1902.5 
R2 0.9980 S.E. of regression 0.1162 
Residual S.Sq. 0.2702 Mean of dependent variable 3.4194 
S.D. of dep. var. 2.5835 Maximum of log-likelihood 25.2390 
DW statistic 1.5552 
with the introduction of a slope dummy to account for a significant shift in 
policy from a system of controls to rapid devaluations. 
The parallel rate was used in the above estimation since that rate reflects 
better the cost of obtaining foreign exchange. An alternative estimation was 
done with the parallel rate replaced by the official exchange rate. A non-nested 
hypothesis testing performed, favoured the former model against the latter 
model. See Appendix II. 
The regression result in Table 2 indicates that supply constraint is the 
strongest force behind Ghana's inflationary push. A 1% slump in production, 
keeping all other variables constant, leads to a 1.17% increase in the rate of 
inflation. It is further observed that lag effects of slumps in production, though 
significant, are not very pronounced. This may due to the fact that food, a 
perishable product, exerts an immediate effect on price levels. (Food accounts 
for over 50% of the CPI.) In Figure 2, it can be observed that prior to 1978 
inflationary peaks have been preceded by output slumps. The high peaks of 
1977, 1981 and 1983 seem to have longer output lags. This may be an 
indication that other factors are at play in Ghana's inflationary spiral. In 
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Appendix III, the lagged output structure was dropped and it only increased the 
significance of the current output effect. 
Monetary pressures are the next strongest force behind Ghana's inflation. 
Unlike Chhibber and Shafik (1990), this study finds output stronger than 
monetary pressures. As explained above in Section III, by modelling the real 
factors as excess demand for real balances, Chhibber and Shafik 
over-emphasize the monetary pressures. As will be further explained below, 
monetary pressures are still at play in the ERP era since there are still huge 
increases in money supply, albeit from another source. 
One year's lag in monetary expansion appears to have a greater effect on 
prices than a two-year lag. A slope dummy, introduced to illustrate the large 
monetary expansions which began in 1973, did not appear significant. See 
Appendix IV. 
The exchange rate devaluations appear to have a significant effect on 
inflation, contrary to Chhibber and Shafik's finding. Of course, this may be 
due to the fact that by having one extra observation, we are able to capture the 
effect missed by Chhibber and Shafik, since their data ended in 1988. Price 
expectations, though significant, carry the wrong sign and seem to exert little 
pressure on inflation. 
V Explanation of sources of inflationary 
pressures 
Demand (monetary) pressures 
Monetary expansion has long played a major role in determining the course of 
inflation in Ghana. To understand its inflation, therefore, it is necessary to 
identify the factors behind rapid monetary growth and excess liquidity supply. 
Since the early 1970s, monetary growth rates have, on average, been fairly 
high. During the decade 1972-82, narrow money supply rose by an average of 
40% per annum. Under the ERP (1983-89), money supply grew by 
approximately the same average. This has happened despite efforts to control 
monetary expansion through fiscal and monetary measures. 
However, whereas in the pre-1983 era money supply was driven 
predominantly by government deficit financing, under the ERP, monetary 
growth has been influenced by a mix of factors of which the budget is only 
one. Major determinants of the rapid monetary expansion and excessive 
liquidity under the ERP include capital inflows, revaluation losses, the budget, 
cocoa financing and financial system deficiencies. 
Capital inflows (the 'NFA factor') 
The ERP has been buttressed by a substantial inflow of external resources. 
These have included grants and loans in support of the various projects and 
programmes. The main inflows have come from the IMF (as balance-of-
payments support) and the World Bank (mainly as sectoral adjustment credits). 
Other inflows have come from other multilateral agencies as well as bilateral 
sources. 
The external inflows have gone to bolster the national reserves and, thus, 
its capacity to increase domestic liquidity (which influence may be termed the 
'net foreign asset (NFA) factor'). A substantial portion of the inflows, indeed, 
result in direct cedi-counterpart payments to domestic entities government, 
public and private organizations, individuals leading directly to enlargement 
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of domestic liquidity, without a corresponding direct increase in the supply of 
imports. 
During 1983-90, gross external inflows averaged more than $650 million 
per annum (Table 3). This constituted a major source of liquidity injection 
demand pressure and inflation in the economy. Added to the official inflows 
were private remittances which have grown markedly under the ERP to more 
than $200 million a year by 1990. This has been aided by the more flexible 
exchange rate policy and more liberal exchange arrangements. Such 
remittances, however, may ease inflationary pressure by generating more 
imports if the foreign exchange is not held as a store of value. 
Table 3 Net external inflows1 ($m), 1983-89 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Net inflows 119.5 369.2 227.0 258.0 580.6 551.3 748.2 
Note: 1. Includes long and medium-term loans, grants, IMF facilities. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1990 Yearbook, and 
Ghana Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, September 
1990. 
Thus, unlike the pre-ERP era when Ghana faced severe foreign exchange 
shortages, under the ERP it has been inundated with capital inflows. The irony, 
however, is that it now seems to be having too much of a good thing, as the 
inflows constitute a major source of liquidity injection, demand pressure and 
inflation in the economy. Without appropriate measures to regulate the inflows, 
including sterilization where possible (for example by investing them abroad), 
or to expedite their utilization, the problem will continue to plague the 
economy. 
Revaluation losses 
Revaluation losses comprise losses to government arising from revaluation 
(following exchange rate depreciation) of accrued external commitments oil 
bills, dividends awaiting transfer, current payment arrears, repurchases to the 
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IMF other outstanding loans, etc. Instead of being charged to the account of 
p o v e r n m e n t , whose liability they were, the losses were allowed to accumulate 
in the books of the Central Bank where a 'pseudo-asset' was created in the 
form of long-term government debt. This, in reality, implied indirect extension 
of credits by the Central Bank to government. And like any other such credits, 
they constituted liquidity injections into the economy. 
With the massive exchange rate depreciation from 2.75 cedis to the US 
dollar in 1983, to more than 350 cedis in 1990, the losses increased 
substantially, reaching some 311 billion cedis by September 1990, compared 
with a total (narrow) money supply figure of about 180 billion cedis at the 
same time. 
Aside from their liquidity implications, another dimension of the revaluation 
losses was that they seriously eroded the financial standing of the Central 
Bank. Long-term securities were issued by government to the Central Bank to 
cover accrued losses as of September 1990. Only interest payments, nominally 
fixed at 4%, would be charged to the government budget.5 Since then, 
revaluation losses have been rightly treated as credits to government and 
chargcd directly to government account, implying direct additions to domestic 
liquidity. 
Thus, the revaluation losses, whether treated as long-term government debt 
in Central Bank books, as before, or whether directly charged to government 
account as credits, as at present, constitute an important source of liquidity 
injection and, therefore, of inflationary pressure in the economy. Only a 
programmed phasing out of accumulated losses (through redemption of issued 
securities) coupled with appropriate macroeconomic measures to stabilize 
exchange rates (to avoid further excessive losses) can provide the needed 
remedy. 
Table 4 Revaluation losses 1983-90 (cedi billion) 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 19901 
Annual losses - 16.1 1.0 15.1 17.9 89.6 62.1 109.3 
Cumulative losses - 16.1 17.1 32.1 50.0139.6 201.7 311.0 
Mote: I. September figure. 
Source: Sank of Ghana. 
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Prior to the ERP, the main-spring of liquidity injection into the economy was 
government budget deficit financing as budgetary over-runs were financed 
from the banking system, especially the Central Bank. Under the ERP, the 
policy has been to reduce deficits and use bank financing. 
As a result of price de-regulation, a more flexible exchange rate policy, and 
improved tax administration, the revenue side of the budget has shown marked 
improvements. Thus, since 1986, the budget has shown successive surpluses, 
enabling net repayments to the banking system. 
It needs to be pointed out that only a narrow coverage of the budget shows 
these surpluses. This coverage excludes expenditure on development projects 
financed from external project loans. A broader coverage including these items 
shows large deficits (see Table 5). The project loans which form financing 
items then constitute an important source of liquidity injection into the 
economy. 
Table 5 Government budget, 1985-90 (cedi billion) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
(a) Narrow coverage1 
Total revenue and grants 40.3 73.6 111.0 142.7 207.0 269.2 
Total expenditure and net lending 47.9 73.3 1-07.0 138.8 197.0 251.4 
Surplus (+)/deficit (-) 7.6 0.3 4.1 3.9 10.0 17.8 
(b) Broad coverage 
Total revenue and grants2 42.4 81.1 124.8 157.9 230.5 309.3 
Total expenditure and net lending3 52.7 98.1 142.8 185.2 271.4 355.3 
Surplus (+)/deficit (-) -10.3 -17.0 -18.0 -27.3 -40.9 -46.0 
Notes: 1. Narrow coverage excludes capital expenditure financed through external 
project aid and the corresponding grants and loans. 
2. Including external project grants. 
3. Including capital expenditure financed through external project aid. 
Source: IMF Staff Report, 1990. 
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Thus domestically financed deficits which characterized the pre-ERP period 
and formed the basis of monetary growth have been replaced under the ERP 
by externally financed deficits. This new mode of financing entails a new 
channel of liquidity injection into the economy. Thus, in spite of the surpluses 
declared since 1986 from the narrow budget coverage, the government budget 
may still form a significant source of demand pressure and inflation. Another 
possibility is that, since external financial support may generate more imports, 
it may ease supply and inflationary pressure. 
Cocoa financing 
Every year, large amounts of liquidity are injected into the economy through 
cocoa financing, increasing demand and inflation pressure. To purchase the 
year's cocoa crop and fund its operational costs, the Cocoa Board 
(COCOBOD) issues cocoa bills to the Central Bank, commercial banks and the 
non-bank public for discounting and provision of funds. In the pre-ERP period, 
most of the cocoa bills were picked up by the Central Bank. Furthermore, 
during that period external cocoa proceeds were often inadequate to cover the 
total cost of cocoa financing, because of a grossly over-valued exchange rate 
and excessive operational costs of COCOBOD. This led to a massive build-up 
of Central Bank overdrafts to COCOBOD. 
Under the ERP, it has been the policy to shift cocoa financing to the 
non-bank public, with commercial banks (and the Central Bank, where 
necessary) picking up any residual bills. Now that there have been large 
exchange rate adjustments and a reduction of COCOBOD operational 
expenses, external proceeds are more than adequate to cover costs, i.e., the 
cocoa sector is ultimately self-financing. Nevertheless, cocoa financing 
continues to add liquidity to the economy, regardless of the source of initial 
funding, whether from banks or the non-bank public. 
Although other exports may add liquidity to the economy, cocoa is unique 
because of the magnitude of these injections. With the current producer price 
of 240,000 cedis per metric tonne, and a crop volume of the order of 300,000 
metric tonnes, payments to producers will amount to some 72 billion cedis, 
which may be compared with a money stock level of about 188 billion cedis 
(November 1990). This may lead to a substantial increase in demand pressure 
in the economy which can be particularly harmful if it coincides with periods 
of lean supply of goods. 
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Financial system deficiencies 
The deficiencies of the financial system have contributed to the excessive 
build-up of liquidity outside the banking arena and to inflationary pressure in 
the economy in general. Over the years, the intermediation role of banks has 
declined, with low deposit mobilization on one hand, and inadequate scope for 
channelling resources to support productive activity on the other. The banks 
were persistently saddled with excess liquidity owing to the limited avenues 
for investment (due to credit ceilings and lack of financial investment 
opportunities). There was therefore little incentive for them to mobilize 
deposits from the public. Large portions of bank loans, both to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the private sector, remained uncollected (due, amongst 
others, to management, institutional and regulatory inadequacies). This had 
compounded the excessive liquidity supply outside the banking system. By 
September 1990, these bad loans amounted to about 50 billion cedis. 
Government issued bonds in 1990 to banks to cover bad loans, in order to 
restore their financial standing. These stocks, redeemable over five years (SOE 
loans) and ten years (private sector loans), were designed to bring interest of 
12% and 7.4% respectively. 
Although external funding was obtained for the exercise under the Financial 
Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP), the funds have been kept in blocked 
accounts as only interest payments are currently charged to the budget. The 
Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) has been set up to recover 
and manage the bad loans. NPART has picked the non-performing assets off 
the balance sheets of the banks with the support of external aid. This injected 
more liquidity into the economy and might form a substantial source of 
demand pressure and inflation.6 
The FINSAP is meant to address many of the inadequacies of the-financial 
system in order to enhance the intermediation role of banks. When this has 
been achieved, it is hoped that there will be more scope for avoiding further 
build-up or reducing existing liquidity within and outside the banking system. 
Supply pressures 
Supply pressures have always played a role in fuelling inflation in Ghana. This 
is quite evident from the graph in Figure 2. Inflationary peaks have usually 
been preceded by output slumps. This is especially so with food production. 
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Food prices 
The extent to which the food price index drives the general index is proved by 
the weight it is given in the latter. In the calculation of the Consumer Price 
Index, food is assigned a weight of 0.492, based on 1977 household survey 
data. This is a gross understatement for the 1980s. The more recent 1987-88 
Ghana Living Standard Survey shows that, on the average, food accounts for 
about 66.4% of total expenditure. Thus, fluctuations in food prices should have 
an even greater weight than is presently accounted for in the general price 
index. 
Table 6 indicates that per capita food production started declining from the 
early 1970s, reaching its nadir in 1983; apart from a brief recovery in 1984, 
food production has still remained low. Whereas the low indices in 1981-83 
can be explained by the drought which hit the whole of the Sahel region in the 
early 1980s, the subsequent stagnation of food production after 1984 may be 
linked to the switch from the production of food to tradable goods, particularly 
cocoa. 
Table 6 Production indices, 1970-87 (1979-81 = 100) 
Year Agricultural Food Non-food Food/capita 
1970 118 118 132 158 
1971 125 124 151 162 
1972 117 117 162 149 
1973 116 116 134 144 
1974 129 129 129 156 
1975 124 123 163 145 
1976 109 108 167 123 
1977 97 97 125 107 
1978 96 96 100 103 
1979 101 101 97 104 
1980 101 101 103 101 
1981 98 98 100 94 
1982 94 94 100 88 
1983 88 87 105 79 
1984 116 116 110 102 
1985 114 114 87 97 
1986 119 120 76 98 
1987 118 119 88 94 
Source: World Bank, World Tables, Stars Disk, 1990. 
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Since 1984, exchange rate and trade liberalization policies introduced under the 
ERP have made farm inputs available. However, the same policies have made 
it more lucrative for farmers to be in the tradable sector than in food 
production. Table 7 shows the terms of trade between food and non-food 
consumer items, and also relative prices of food to cocoa. Since 1984, the 
terms of trade have moved against food production. Adjustments in the 
producer price of cocoa have also caused cocoa farmers to compete effectively 
with food farmers for farm inputs. 
Table 7 Relative prices of food: Ghana 1977-87 (1977=100) 
1977 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Terms of trade of 
food/non-food 100 96 91 112 138 86 60 57 55 
Relative prices of food/ cocoa production 100 131 92 125 184 136 64 51 42 
Source: Loxley (1988), Table 10. 
Shortages in food production are usually accentuated by rigidities in the 
transport and distribution network in the country. Data from the Ministry of 
Agriculture suggest that transport alone accounts for 50% of food costs to 
consumers in Ghana.7 Increases in the costs of fuel and spare-parts, and the 
lack of good feeder-roads, are easily translated into inflationary pressures. 
Recent adjustments to the exchange rate, coupled with the removal of 
subsidies, have caused massive increases in the price of petroleum products. 
Between 1984 and 1990, petrol (super) prices have risen from 53.54 cedis to 
1,000 cedis per gallon. These increases exert diametrically opposing pressures 
on the inflationary spiral. While the removal of subsidies lessens the budgetary 
pressures on government, inflationary pressures are reintroduced through cost 
factors. The removal of petrol subsidies increases transport costs and generates 
inflationary pressures, though these pressures have only a one-time impact 
Other distributional factors have also influenced the inflationary situation 
in the country. Lack of feeder roads has at times caused food to rot in the 
villages while there were shortages in the cities and towns. Though the 
situation has improved slightly since the road rehabilitation works started in 
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the ERP period, the lack of good roads is still a source of variability in 
inflation. A market survey conducted by the authors in 1990 in three cities 
(Accra, Tema and Takoradi) showed that prices of commodities are affected 
by location of market and seller concentration. Prices are generally lower in 
Accra than in any of the other cities, indicating that Accra generally acts as the 
focal point for distribution. Prices in other cities are therefore affected by their 
distance from Accra. 
The survey also indicated that some product groups exhibit wider price 
variability than others, such as maize, a staple diet for most Ghanaians. Items 
sold in fixed units, such as balls of kenkey and bottles of beer, have very little 
price variability. The variability of prices is influenced by supply inelasticities 
of the product as well as seller concentration of the commodities. 
Distributional bottlenecks such as transport difficulties and inadequate flow of 
information influence the variability of prices. Note, however, that the 
variability of prices gives us a cross-sectional behavioural pattern, but offers 
very little information as far as the dynamics of inflation is concerned. 
Expectations 
From the early 1960s until 1983, the Ghanaian economy could be said to have 
operated under a 'controlled' regime. It was a period during which most prices, 
exchange rates and rates of interest were fixed by government. During that 
period, price expectations played very little role in the inflationary process. 
After the introduction of the ERP, price controls were removed, interest rates 
were liberalized, and the exchange rate was allowed to be determined by 
market forces. 
Expectations in the foreign exchange market seem to influence price 
formation a great deal. Sellers usually build into their mark-ups their 
expectations about rates of depreciation of the cedi. At the start of the foreign 
exchange auction in September 1986, the spread between the marginal rate 
determined at the auction and the parallel rate was quite significant. Most 
imports, especially of consumer goods, were brought in through the parallel 
market and hence the auction rate had very little influence on price 
expectations. By 1988 when the government licensed individuals to operate 
forex bureaux for the sale and purchase of foreign exchange, the spread 
between the two rates closed. Importers started paying closer attention to the 
auction rate, speculations about which then started to affect the general price 
level. Speculation on the foreign exchange market was further intensified with 
the 'unification' of the parallel and auction rates in June 1990. To the extent 
that these speculations feed into the local price system, the recent devaluations 
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in Ghana might have had some effect on the inflation in the country. The 
econometric results of both Chhibber and Shafik (1990), and our own 
estimation above, failed to capture recent foreign exchange adjustments 
because of data limitations. 
Expectations did not feature much in the determination of wages in Ghana. 
Since the ERP, government has had a policy of keeping the wage bill around 
5% of GDP. 8 Little room is allowed for price expectations to be included in 
contract negotiations. It has become customary for the government to begin 
wage negotiations at least three months after reading the annual budget. This 
may be a conscious policy to prevent wage-push inflation, but the social and 
political consequences of such wage repression may be more traumatic than 
inflation. 
VI Conclusion 
Inflation in Ghana was the result of both real and monetary shocks to the 
economy. Though monetary factors played a significant role in pre-ERP 
inflation, supply factors which had always offered a push came to the fore 
during the ERP period. Our econometric results point out that supply factors 
constitute a much stronger inflationary force than monetary factors. Measures 
to control inflation must therefore emphasize enhancing production and supply, 
especially of food. It is also imperative that efforts be made to improve 
distribution and road networks to reduce costs. 
Though a lot of efforts have been made to curb domestic credit expansion, 
a new source of growth in the money supply has been found in the changes in 
net foreign assets. With the capital inflows since the ERP, growth in money 
supply has been at about the same average as before the ERP. Monetary 
expansion will need to be controlled through more disciplined financial 
management to counteract potential externally generated liquidity injections. 
The fiscal restraint which started with the ERP should be continued to prevent 
another source of monetary expansion. 
Exchange rate adjustments, although showing no strong influence in our 
study, could still be a potential source of inflation, especially from 1990. The 
auction and parallel rates have now virtually merged and hence all the 
economic rents previously enjoyed have been eliminated. Thus, further 
devaluations of the cedi may cause cost-push inflation. 
Thus, the inflationary problem in Ghana is a multi-faceted issue with many 
causes. Inflationary control should therefore aim at policies directed to both 
real and monetary factors. Structural factors could not be well captured in our 
model because of measurement difficulties. There may be a need for further 
research on the structural causes of inflation. Further econometric work may 
also be necessary to provide more information on the post-ERP inflationary 
situation in Ghana, using quarterly or monthly data. In addition, a 
disaggregated model showing the effect of food vis a vis non-food may explain 
inflation more effectively. 
Notes 
1. See literature review below. 
2. It is quite evident that if inflation had been calculated on actual rather than 
official prices, the rates would have been much higher. 
3. It must, however, be pointed out that during 1983-89 output grew while the 
decade of 1972-82 saw output stagnate or shrink. 
4. Cagan (1956) defines a hyper-inflationary situation as one in which the 
monthly rates of inflation are greater than 50%. 
5. This, of course, amounts to a real transfer to government since it is a 
negative real interest rate. 
6. This, more or less, explains the transmission mechanism rather than a new 
source of inflation. The inflationary pressure is already explained. 
7. See National Food Review Economic Research Service NFR 37, 1987 and 
Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ministry of Agriculture, 1988. 
A market survey carried out in 1990 by the authors puts the average share 
of transport in the cost of food at 30%. These costs account for only 5% in 
the US. 
8. World Bank (1989) p. 52. 
Appendix III 
Indicators of fiscal performance, 1965-88 (Ratios) 
Financing as ratio of GDP Financing as ratio of deficit 
Year Revenue Expenditure Deficit 
1 2 3 4 
Internal From Bank External 
Loans of Ghana loans 
5 6 7 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
0.19 
0.15 
0.17 
0.18 
0.17 
0.19 
0.18 
0.15 
0.11 
0.13 
0.15 
0.13 
0.10 
0.07 
0.10 
0.07 
0.05 
0.06 
0.06 
0.08 
0.12 
0.14 
0.15 
0.15 
0.26 
0.20 
0.23 
0.24 
0.20 
0.22 
0.22 
0.21 
0.17 
0.17 
0.23 
0.25 
0.20 
0.16 
0.17 
0.11 
0.11 
0.11 
0.08 
0.10 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.14 
0.06 
0.05 
0.06 
0.06 
0.03 
0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
0.05 
0.04 
0.08 
0.11 
0.09 
0.09 
0.07 
0.04 
0.06 
0.06 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.011 
0.88 
0.87 
0.76 
0.71 
0.65 
0.90 
0.82 
0.49 
0.90 
1.01 
1.00 
1.00 
0.99 
0.91 
1.00 
0.84 
0.92 
0.91 
0.78 
0.63 
0.53 
17.78 
0.32 
0.62 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0.08 
0.83 
0.94 
1.51 
0.88 
1.36 
0.22 
0.21 
1.78 
0.38 
0.14 
0.09 
0.49 
0.27 
0.60 
0.66 
0.64 
0.03 
0.34 
0.19 
0.27 
0.41 
0.96 
0.27 
0.51 
0.10 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.04 
0.16 
0.08 
0.08 
0.20 
0.37 
0.46 
18.78 
0.13 
0.23 
Note: 1. Budget surplus. 
Source: computed from data from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 
1988 and August 1989 issues. 
Appendix III 
Alternative tests for non-nested regression models 
Dependent variable is P1; 
28 observations used from 1962 to 1989 
Regressors for model M1: C1, M1(-1), M1(-2), Y1, B1, B2, P1(-1) 
Regressors for model M2: C1, M1(-1), M1(-2), Y1, E1, E2, P1(-1) 
Test statistic M1 against M2 M2 against M1 
N-test 1.0761 -2.5767 
NT-test 1.0119 -0.9665 
W-test 1.0594 -0.9267 
J-test 0.2740 2.9560 
JA-test -2.6688 1.0026 
Encompassing F(2,19) = 3.5750 F(2,19) = 4.7010 
Model M1: 
Model M2: 
Model M1+M2: O
D
D
 
II 
II 
II 1.3584; R2 = 0.9975; Log-likelihood 
1.2854; R2 = 0.9973; Log-likelihood 
1.7442; R2 = 0.9980; Log-likelihood 
= 21.5331 
= 20.3765 
= 26.0048 
Akaike's Information Criterion of M1 versus M2 = 1.1565 favours M1; 
Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criterion of M1 versus M2 = 1.565 favours M1 
Appendix III 
Ordinary least squares estimation 
Dependent variable is P1; 
28 observations used for estimation from 1962 to 1-989 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-Ratio 
C1 3.9169 0.9344 4.1920 
M1(-1) 0.6501 0.2605 2.4952 
M1(-2) 0.4058 0.3243 1.2512 
Y1 -1.3910 0.1651 -8.4232 
B1 -0.0579 0.1096 -0.5281 
B2 0.0798 0.0293 2.7228 
P1(-1) 0.0389 0.0282 1.3824 
R2 0.9980 F-statistic F(6,21) 1787.8 
R2 0.9975 S.E. of regression 0.1295 
Residual s.sq. 0.3521 Mean of dependent variable 3.4194 
S.D. of dep. var. 2.5835 Maximum of log-likelihood 21.5331 
DW-statistic 1.3584 Durbin's h-statistic 1.7168 
Appendix III 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is P1 
28 observations used for estimation from 1962 to 1989 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-Ratio 
C1 1.9285 1.1633 1.6579 
M1(-1) 0.6322 0.2369 2.6689 
M1(-2) 0.5201 0.2988 1.7407 
M2 0.2101 0.2531 0.8304 
Y1 -1.1084 0.1894 -5.8533 
Y1(-1) -0.0546 0.0283 -1.9306 
B1 -0.0542 0.1013 -0.5354 
B2 -0.3608 0.5833 -0.6185 
P(-1) -0.0002 0.002 -1.6100 
R2 0.9986 F-statistic F(8,19) 1639.0 
R2 0.9979 S.E. of regression 0.1172 
Residual s. sq. 0.2608 Mean of dependent variable 3.4194 
S.D. of dep. var. 2.5835 Maximum of log-likelihood 25.7381 
DW-statistic 1.5696 
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